Public policy is a discipline of science (science policy), which is defined in academic manner as a science of public policy but it is also the area of programming real public action taken with a view to solving the key problems that emerge in the course of development. Therefore, public policy as a science objectively deals with real public activities programmed both in the institutions of the state but also in other social entities. Scientists have created a lot of its definition (Parsons 2005). Below I understand it as a science that aims at formulating statements about these activities of the state and its citizens that are being taken to solve the key collective problems and have a systemic and organized value and which are derived from produced objectified knowledge (Zybała 2013). They are made using a number of specific tools, such as regulations (legal, but also self-regulation), partnership, education, information, arguing, debating, examination, shaping of stimuli that inspire citizens to attitudes consistent with public goals as well as evaluation, expert (policy analysis), institutions (public offices and networks of social organizations) etc.

Below I present a hypothesis concerning the characteristics of the national profile of public policy in Poland. The issue of policy profile is present in the literature and the scholars undertake to analyze it in relation to certain countries or a group of countries. They point to factors that shape it. They usually cite cultural factors but also political, economic, structural, etc. (Adolino, Blake 2001)

Francis G. Castles introduced the concept of national/state profile of public policy making (countries's policy profiles). He indicates that it is just a derivative of historical and cultural tradition (so-called factors of long duration) (Castles 2000, p. 301). They pre-judge extensively about the fact that
some societies prefer to create solutions to collective problems based on public actions, more centrally programmed, and others on the basis of various activities undertaken by citizens or self-organized group of citizens.

Castles extracts the policy profile appropriate for a group of Anglo-Saxon and German-speaking countries, Latin/South countries and Scandinavian countries. It says that the Anglo-Saxon societies are individualistic where Scandinavian societies – collectivistic (there is no reason to confuse them with societies that have been centrally collectivized by the Soviet system). In turn, the Latin countries have a long tradition of strong grassroots support for the activities of the central government.

J. Richardson, G. Gustaffson and G. Jordan also dealt with national insignia in public policy making (Richardson, Gustaffson, Jordan 1982, p. 13). They point to a number of criteria that can be taken in typologing of national styles of policy making, for example on the basis of decision making (e.g. the level of their centralization), methods of their implementation and executing of public decisions, techniques of public decision-making or how to typologize problems (typologies of issues). However, in their opinion, the style in public policy is primarily determined by the specifics of government approach to problem solving and the specificity of the relationship between government and other actors in the policy-making process. They distinguish four styles that they formulated based on the following criteria (Figure 1):

- anticipation (how widely understood policy-makers work anticipated against emerging problems due to the strong tendency to analyze, deliberate them, etc.),
- reactivity (how policy-makers react to problems after their occurrence),
- consensuality (how policy-makers try to get a consensus with other stakeholders on their projects actions/ public intervention),
- the tendency to impose solutions to specific problems (how policy-makers tend to impose their decisions to others than to reach a consensus).

Furthermore, according to these scholars, public policy is strongly based on social norms recognized in a given national society. They provide legitimacy for the conduct of public activity (policy activity) in a given style.
It is worthy to point out one more trend in the science of public policy, which representatives analyze the differences in national policy making processes. He mentioned the achievements of Mary Douglas, British anthropologist and her cultural theory – net/group (group-grip cultural theory). In this case, the scholars as the criterion for separating the four styles take the types of social relationships that exist in given societies.

Scientists have identified four „ideal” models of social relations and a direct criterion to separate them is how much the individuals in social relations are autonomous (to what extent they are connected with the net social norms), the second criterion is how the units are under pressure from group decisions (how much they are „collectivized”) (Swedlow 2002, p. 269):

- individualistic society (the units have a large degree of autonomy in their efforts, but they are capable of self-organization and production of trust. Social relations are smooth),
- fatalistic society (atomized units are influenced by others as well as a network of social norms; individuals have the feeling that reality is unpredictable and people usually unreliable. „Fate” determines everything),
- egalitarian society (units are autonomous, capable of cooperation and collective action, the emphasis on development opportunities for all),
– hierarchical society (individuals are strongly positioned in the social structure, influence by other subjects, a large role of control mechanisms).

Societies, with a specific profile type of social relations, have a different approach to policy-making, they also have other problems and other „competitive advantage” in the process. Societies with individualistic type of relationship may have problems with coordination, which is essential for public activities. Hierarchical societies may have problem with carrying out a process of consultation and deliberation on the projects of actions because stronger stakeholders may have tendency to act unilaterally. On the other hand, in „fatalistic” societies there can be a problem with the mobilization of collective actions to diagnose problems, as there is a tendency to exhibit little faith in the sense of actions (because it is believed that the result is prejudged). In contrast, the egalitarian societies may have a problem with giving stimuli to activity, both public and in the private sphere.

**Key features of public policy in Poland**

Perhaps I will fail to fully characterize the profile of public policy in Poland especially that above I mentioned a lot of potential its components, which are included in the various trends of science and public policy. That’s why I focus on the most important features that in my opinion imply another ones.

My hypothesis, concerning the profile objectively relates primarily to the question of the main instrument used in public activities as well as the course of action. So the process of policy formulation in Poland is largely reduced to the lawmaking process, which is accompanied by a low level of interest in the use of non-legislative instruments of action (the so-called soft instruments in the policies). It is indicated by observation and qualitative analysis carried out recently (Zybała 2014). The projects of public activities are normally expressed in the form of draft legislation. They are considered by the government but also by other actors of public action, as almost the only instrument to ensure the achievement of results planned to be achieved in a given field.

In Polish literature of the subject it is easy to find a number of authors who formulate a similar position, although not all of them express it in a lan-
guage specific to the doctrine of public policy (Rymsza 2004; Wlodarczyk 1998, 2003, 2005). Jan Szczepański, a few decades ago, showed that public interventions are focused on creating legislation what takes place without taking complementary actions towards the creation of legislation. He includes there the creation of organizational and analytical capabilities that would ensure efficient conduct of planned activities, produce proper climate of cooperation among stakeholders of a given policy and achieve appropriate level of problem understanding, which is to be the subject of actions (Szczepański 1973, p. 111). According to Szczepański, public actions are understood too technically as the proverbial arrangement of seats on the board, which means without analysis of the nature of the problem.

Jerzy Regulski, promoter and reform originator in the administrative structure of the country in 1990 also pointed out that public actions are understood in a rather simplified way as changes in the law (Regulski 2014). An additional problem in the policies is that there is an excess of rules and their continuous change. Szczepański wrote, “... none of the previous acts came fully into force because it was changed immediately.” A lot of legal acts, during last years, were amended even dozens of times in the course of several years.

Phase model of policy-making

To the above thesis about bringing politics into the process of law-making, I would like to add another one. It says that the process of policy-making in Poland gives a good image by the model of the classical public policy making (policy cycle), which was formulated in the US in the early development of science and public policy. It is still often cited in many Anglo-Saxon textbooks (Kraft, Furlog 2007, p. 71). It is based on the assumption that the formation of public policy is a linear process, highly rationalized, hierarchical, which runs through clearly defined stages, from the public problem definition phase to the phase of evaluating its results (Figure 2).

However, I would like to emphasize that in Poland this process is not completely the same as represented in the Anglo-Saxon textbooks. It results from the increased role of the political class, which has an almost monopolistic position in the field of policy-making. It does not have to share the power of impact on the solutions with experts, scholars and all the rest of various stakeholders, as it usually takes place in Western countries. Thus,
policy-making process is strongly hierarchical (Figure 3). It can be also said that the level of democratic public policies in Poland is much lower.

It should be noted that the Anglo-Saxon model of „policy cycle” was formulated at a time when on the West the policy-making process was also quite hierarchical. In the 40s and 50s of the last century it was considered that it would remain in this way because it would be a domain of representative power and that the public administration would subordinate it. However, it changed in the subsequent decades when a „power disperse” between a growing number of entities in the sphere of public actions and policy-making process gradually occurred and became much more complex (Levi-Faur 2012).

Figure 2. A cycle of public policy-making

The process of public policy-making and its rationality

The above-mentioned centralization of decision-making process and its hierarchy is the result of the statistic model of public management (Peters, Pierre 2005). It means that governors have a strong tendency to act unilaterally and the primary means of public action is to make – as I mentioned
above – records of top law. The authority gives permission to participate in
the policy-making process. Moreover, the authority is the entity which has
the title to „perceive” and define the nature of the problem as well as to lead
the entire process of creating solutions and their implementation.

Now let’s have a look at the issue of the rationality of the above process
in Poland (above, I noted that it is assumed that the cycle of policy-making
is considered to be rationalized). I do not want to say that in Poland it is ex-
tremely strongly based on a rational analysis that – what’s more – leads to
obtaining optimal results from the taken actions. Well, in Polish realities the
rationality comes out almost exclusively from the hierarchy, so the impact
on policy-making process is strictly determined by the political hierarchy
(what happens at the expense of participation in the process of independent
entities, including experts).

It can be basically said that this hierarchy provides this process with only
a semblance of rationality. It is expressed mainly in the adherence to certain
procedures of law-making for the purpose of implementing public policy. It
ensures that there is generally no open chaos and total randomness in policy
programming. On the other hand we deal here with the high price paid for
this model. Well, there is no open deliberations in the programming period
where various pros and cons, on how to solve the public problem, are made.
It decreases the efficiency of public actions and often condemns them to
failure before they even have been taken.

Moreover, in Poland, we can talk about an additional factor that increas-
es the specific feature of rationality in the policy-making process. It is ex-
pressed in the tendency, according to which the actors of policies (espe-
cially the governors) appear to believe deeply in the existence of a simple
cause-and-effect relationship between public action project (expressed in
legislation) and its outcome. This type of thinking is deeply rooted and per-
petuated because usually there is no evaluation of public actions that could
possibly reveal what the results actually came from a given public action.

So there are many reasons why the policy-making process in Poland
should be presented rather in the concepts specific to the theory of linear
(rationalized) rather than in terms of different non-linear theories (includ-
ing incremental). The second ones assume that policy-making is burdened
with a significant dose of chaos and you never know what concept will be
pushed through, also because of the participation of a significant number
of stakeholders in the entire process. However, the non-linear theories do not assume that in the policy-making process there is no place for rational analysis and deliberation based on reasonable evidence. They only say that the process is extremely complex and its full rationality is not possible to achieve. The efforts, taken for the actions, do not arise from the fact that they are the most rational, which, for example, offer the greatest value for the spent money (value for money). The diversity of group interests or diversity of preferences among policy stakeholder come into play.

Figure 3. A functioning cycle of public policy in Poland

In Western countries the rationalized and phased policy model has generated quite quickly a considerable polemical literature (Lindblom 1959, pp. 79–88.). Over time, a number of alternative models for policy-making have been created (Sabatier 2007). They pointed out that public actions in policies are much more complex than the presented model, based on the phases. It results from many reasons – the complexity of interests and diversity of preferences occurring among stakeholders, the boundaries of human cognition, lack of adequate knowledge about the problem to be solved, the unpredictability of the phenomena that take place in the environment of the problem occurrence, etc.
Ch. Lindbom wrote, „Creating a policy is, at best, a rough process. Neither sociologists nor politicians, nor the officers know enough about the social realities to avoid repeatable mistakes in predicting the consequences of public actions. A prudent policy makers expect that their policies will reach only a fraction of what they wish and, at the same time, they know that they will produce unintended consequences, which they would like to avoid. If they pass through a series of gradual changes they avoid serious and persistent mistakes in several ways” (Lindblom 1959, p. 86).1

In Poland, the phenomena, that could undermine rationalistic and hierarchical model of public policy making, have never occurred so far. Although, some events take place which could affect the changes in the future. There also have not been any critical reflection in this area, which would indicate that public actions can be carried out in another model. It results from many factors, but it is essential that, in fact, in Poland there was no specific dispersion of power between the various entities (Zybała 2013). Politicians can still maintain the tools of effect providing themselves – as I mentioned above – with absolute primacy. This situation takes place at the expense of limiting the impact on policy of public administration (assuming that it should be relatively autonomous body towards political class), but most of all, on the independent experts. It is related to the fact that there is no objectified knowledge, producing evidence to confirm the legitimacy of the decisions.

**Cultural sources of public policy in Poland**

The profile of public policy in Poland, as in any other country, must have its sources. As I previously mentioned, they may be cultural but also economic, political, structural. Below I point mainly the cultural factors. In my opinion, they greatly prejudice the fact that Poland, in many policies, obtains poor results, especially in such policies as health, education, social policy, labor market policy, innovation policy, etc. It is also not able to formulate its strategies correctly and consistently achieve them. But I would not like to underestimate also the economic factors that are derived from general economic backwardness, which lasts at least since the seventeenth century.

Thus, Poland is not able to spend on public activities as much as wealthier Western countries for many centuries. It is also affected by structural factors, the ability to create institutions with the appropriate potential reform.

However, below I emphasize that the poor results in public activities have their main source in cultural and sociological conditions. They make that public actions have been brought to the law-making process. They are characterized – as I pointed out above – with strongly marked centralization and hierarchicity of influence on the process of their programming and fairly simplistic form of rationality.

Centralized and hierarchical policy-making process I have brought to the monopolistic position of the political class. Its oligarchization and peculiar alienation are also visible easily. All this is the result of processes taking place for centuries. This is the result of strong state divisions visible in Polish society since at least the sixteenth century. Later, it led to strong distances (a sense of alienation) between social groups as well as to confrontationality in relations between the actors of public actions. Hence, the belief that only a strong or even authoritarian government can ensure relative stability in relations between warring groups could arise.

The unilaterality of governmental actions in public policy was facilitated by, visible in Poland for centuries, low level of public participation in public activities. This is a result of low sense of subjectivity, especially of groups which are economically and educationally weaker. Many historians consider it as a very long lasting effect, in Poland but also in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, of peasants’ serfdom and their considerable cultural distance towards the leading social groups (nobility and subsequent intelligence that derives from it). Furthermore, due to the agricultural character of the country, the peasants (farmers) statistically accounted for the vast majority of the population. In the end it was reflected in low level of socialization of the decision-making process (low participation). In the vast space of time there was also:

- low sense of shared responsibility for the conditions of public issues in the majority of the policy stakeholder (the fact that their sense of responsibility is limited mainly to the level of social microstructures or the circle of family and peer),

- strong tendency of actors to treat many problems, occurring in the public space, as „private” (e.g. unemployment is often considered only as a problem of the unemployed, not a public issue),
preferences towards individualistic values (strengthen themselves vs. crossing each other) and conservative (adaptation to the status quo vs. openness to change) (Ciechiuch 2013, pp. 45–64.)

The sociologists, in various ways, justify the above arguments pointing to the specific nature of the social relationship (ties), which developed in Poland in the processes of long duration and as a result of formation a specific type of socialization. A crucial to their understanding is a thesis of Stefan Nowak about the so-called sociological vacuum (emptiness). He pointed out that in Poland the micro-social relationships (family ties and ties in narrow friendly circles) dominate the macro-relationships (links between members of the wider community). This means that the Poles are the most willing and the most effective in operating in these microstructures. The relationships, existing within their area, are the most binding in the sense that they generate a sense of commitment and responsibility. In contrast, non-family ties are weak, they do not generate a high sense of responsibility for actions taken collectively (Nowak 1979).

In recent years many texts that support the thesis of sociological vacuum have appeared (Czapiński 2006; Staniszkis, Zybała 2004; Cześnik 2004; Kubiak, Miszalska 2004, p. 19; Pawlak 2015). They point to the process of disintegration of ties, atomization and the proof is the decreasing, since the early 90s, level of trust, which in Poland is much lower than in Western countries. It is worthy to mention that the thesis of Nowak was confirmed in descriptions of historians (Buckner, History of Polish culture, p. 63; Jasienica 2007, p. 45). They pointed out that Poland was regarded in the past more as a federation of neighborhoods (meaning family) than a structurally homogeneous state, or an association of sovereign farms (agricultural enterprises). Therefore they pointed to the predominance of micro-social relations over the relations in a wider scale.

**Between a family and society**

The sociologists also wrote about sharp dualism, that is, a separation of „private world and public, real and official, the world of people’ and ‘world of institutions” (Tarkovsky 1994, p. 264; Wedel 2007; Giza-Poleszczuk 2009). Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski pointed to a duality of attitudes and moral values „depending on whether a potential partner is the second person or institution”. This en-
tailed „a split between what people think [privately – AZ] and what they do [in public – AZ].” He pointed at the micro-social structures that are teeming with busy life because they operate outside the formal public institutions. One of the consequences in the communist period was the rise of a strong distinction between „us” (narrow groups) and „them” (representatives of the formal system but also those outside their family and social circle), (Wnuk-Lipinski 1996, p. 238). It survived to a large extent also after 1990 in a new form. Janusz Czapiński writes that in place of macro-social ties, the Poles had driven themselves into a resourceful individualism. The Poles „not so much revolt against the ailing state but rather can live without it” (Rychard 2006, p. 214).

Mirosława Marody indicated that Poles live in a private world where they do well, often based on informal rules as well as in the official world, where they act with just about learned helplessness. Kazimierz Z. Sowa put it another way. In his opinion, the Poles are not able to cope in the public sphere (Sowa 2012, p. 23), „with great difficulty they find their way to agreement on matters relating to the common good”, and „generally cope well in their households and in circles of friends, as well as in business”. He also wrote that in the private sphere (social, friendly life) Poles have many positive attributes but in public life can soar to the heights only in the face of huge crises and threats. The worst situation is in daily civil life. The floor is taken by negative destructive features hostile to developing and strengthening the civil community” (Sowa 2012a, p. 110).

On the other hand, Piotr Gliński stressed that Polish society is „a mosaic of many enclaves” (Glinski 2007, p. 126). In his view, „a multitude of enclaves is a proof of weakness of Polish civil society and its macro-structures. The enclaveness means weakness of positive, horizontal interpersonal and intergroup relations; it indicates a low level of openness to others, multiple isolated social identities. This entails a deficit of inclusioness, a dialogue, networking in social relations.

Jacek Tarkowski stated that a specific structure of Polish society (federation of small and highly integrated internally groups), makes that there is a strong syndrome of „amoral familyism” (Tarkovsky 1994a). There is also a shaping, in many cases and areas, of patron-customer relations (understood as mutual relationship, often asymmetrical relationship between individuals remaining in close relationships). According to Antoni Mączak, clientelism in Poland remained strongly rooted than in the West. Between
the sixteenth and the eighteenth century it was almost everywhere the essence of the contemporary system of government (Mączak 2000, p. 30), but in the West since then its range was rapidly shrunk, while in Poland it remained deeply rooted. During the communist era, and later, the clientelism remained functionalized, so its presence conditioned the functioning of relevant mechanisms of a state and decision-making processes.

„Soft state”

Below I would like to point out the way of functioning of the state, as a result of the above outlined features of social relations. Well, in Poland a strong trend in the social sciences is visible. It highlights the fact that key decisions in the country are taken in the sphere of informal relations. It points out that often there is no clear boundary between the activities of informal groups and activities of state institutions.

Some researchers indicate that a model of „soft state” has been created (Hausner 2009). On one hand, its institutions limit the activity of the citizens but on the other hand it is not able to perform tasks, traditionally attributed to the institutions of the state. It is not capable of generating public services on a supportable level, and therefore it is not able to perform a number of public policies. It cannot cope with defending the public interest against the group particularism. There is also a division of public sector into zones of impact (Jasiecki 2013, p. 212). State institutions are sometimes a part of the network which are organized for the execution of the collective interests.

The reference is made here to mechanisms of violating public interest, the emergence of informal interest groups that use your location to multiply particular benefits at the expense of others (Zybertowicz 2005; Hausner 2007). They work often in an informal way at the joint of different sectors and institutions. They can uphold the position of the obsolete economic structures, e.g. heavy industry. J. Sroka indicates that in Poland we deal with easy establishment of interest coalition and a formation of not transparent rules of influence. He writes about distributive cartels (Sroka 2000). This in turn is to create a threat to the transparency of the decision-making process. However, Jadwiga Staniszkis pointed to the emergence of super-corporation at the joint of administration and selected associations, employers’ representatives and others (Staniszkis 2001).
Adam Podgórecki formulated a thesis that in Poland, in the situation of public action, the actors have a tendency to form so-called dirty communities, the creation of groups which cooperation is often breaks the law to obtain particular benefits. They create a „network of mutual ties, based on loyalties that are „cemented by family ties, mutually provided services, association in making a variety of (...) law violations, awareness of various reprehensible deeds, participation in mutually beneficial informalities, a possibility of mutual blackmail...” (Podgórecki 1995). The term „dirty community” was also picked up by Janine R. Wedel, Polish-American sociologist who popularized it in English as „dirty togetherness” (Wedel 2003, pp. 139–159).

The historians quite commonly indicate that the state in Poland has not developed such forms of action, which would be similar to the state institutions in the West. It did not ensure the security of citizens and the conditions for personal and social development. A. Wyczański writes about the country of the eighteenth century when it did not provide a decent judiciary (lack of enforcement), decent working bodies of police and law enforcement (protection of life, property). There was the belief that only group solidarity, including neighborhood or local, can protect the citizens and give them a chance for a decent life.” A common plane was represented by close social contacts ... a sense of solidarity with strangers and other lands, finally the council, where the gentry meet, adopt the provisions of law enforcement, taxation, often their resolution, sometimes even establish a district militia when danger required that” (Wyczański 1965, p. 399).

**Intellectual culture and its impact on policy-making**

A feature of public policy in Poland is its weak support for deliberation of (e.g. consultations) expertise. There is a visible lack of concentration on generation of evidence to support their public decisions. This is probably a result of political class dominance in the policy making process, which does not want to limit its voluntarism with results of expert analysis. But it is also a derivative of cultural factors presented above.

In contrast, it is worthy to point also to the specific factors related to the concept of intellectual culture. In the context of the public policy doctrine a term culture analysis should be used here. There are studies proving its weakness visible in the long term. J. Hryniewicz indicates a weak dissem-
ination in Poland of Cartesian cultural ideal, which means a reluctance to deepen the analysis and for spreading problems with the use of rational instruments. This is a consequence of weak rooted Enlightenment traditions in Poland.

In Polish culture, a traditionally critical thinking was quite underestimated as a factor for shaping the environment of life. The historians and sociologists suggest that in the past there were many barriers that restrict the development of culture analysis (long-lasting and deep state divisions, poor state urbanization, weak and late industrialization, long extensive illiteracy, etc.), (Hryniewicz 2004). The scholars have pointed to the deeply rooted tradition of specific Sarmatism (desire of rusticity rather than mental effort), romance (emotions, visions, rather than analysis and feasible solutions), fatalism („what is to be, it will be”, low sense of personal self-agency and subjectivity) (Brandes 1903; Brenda 2003).

The studies of J. Hryniewicz present that Polish organizations show a tendency towards cognitive dogmatism, limiting the diversity of views. There is a tendency to seek „the only cause of everything”. A so-called cognitive dissonance is sometimes felt to the new opinions, which means a sense of frustration and a whole range of unpleasant mental stress as well as anxiety because of the contact with new ideas, information or attitudes. This even leads to avoidance of discussion (Hryniewicz 2007).

There are also studies that indicate that government ministries often cannot cope with the management of knowledge. In addition, half of the respondents admitted that their department does not have a knowledge management policy. The officials do not undertake regular reviews of their own actions, do not have long-lasting relationships with expert institutions. The researchers write about the lack of „effective structures for storage and distribution of knowledge”, which means that it is often lost. Ministries do not submit their program ideas to critical analysis. They act „... in a state of permanent change, without any knowledge about direction and possible effects of further reforms”. This makes it unable to take reasonable actions that could improve the results of the undertaking programs. They restrict their activity to reactive actions, to the so-called „fire extinguishing” (Domaradzka 2010, p. 51). In addition, the studies show that the ministries do not have proper analytical capacity and their employees do not have adequate professional training (Civil Service Department, 2011, p. 26).
problem is also that in the administration rarely work people who had previously worked in research institutions (Civil Service Department 2011, p. 27; Zybała 2009, pp. 24–27).

**Conclusion**

Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe have for centuries a different path of economic and social development. And now they also are at a different stage of development, at least in the economic sense (although there is some convergence). All this must affect the way of public policy making and to what can be described as „policy capacity”. Hence, Leslie Pal could write about the lack of tradition in the analysis of public policy (policy tradition) in Central and Eastern Europe (Pal 2011). M. Potůček and L.T. Leloup wrote that in this part of Europe a process of finding a clear identity for the discipline is continued (Potůček, Leloup 2003, p. 11). A similar assessment is contained in a study published by the Open Society Institute, which is supporting the development of public policies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Young Quinn 2002).

Poland has a chance for improving the methods of programming and the implementation of public policy. This is supported even by the membership in the European Union. This gives the ability to observe how the way of policy-making in countries that deal with it in a better way. At the same time, the professionalization in this area is forced by some dramatic internal problems, as the demographic crisis, a considerable size of emigration of young and educated workforce or still low economic competitiveness. You can sometimes get the impression that they mobilize political and civil groups to attempt in the direction of developing better methods of public action.

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